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1. D efense in Depth: A Flawed strategy for a Sustained Cyber -Siege: Defense in Depth was developed to defend a kinetic or real world mi litary or strategic assets by creating layers of defense that compel the attacker to expend a large amount of resources, while straining supply lines. The tactical goal is to delay and render the enemy

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Expand/Collapse Synopsis. Businesses and Information Technology Security Professionals have spent a tremendous amount of time, money and resources to deploy a Defense in Depth approach to Information Technology Security. Yet successful attacks against RSA, HB Gary, Booz, Allen & Hamilton, the United States Military, and many others are examples of how Defense in Depth, as practiced, is unsustainable and the examples show that the enemy cannot be eliminated permanently.

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A closer look at how Defense in Depth evolved and how it was made to fit within Information Technology is important to help better understand the trends seen today. Knowing that Defense in Depth, as practiced, actually renders the organization more vulnerable is vital to understanding that there must be a shift in attitudes and thinking to better address the risks faced in a more effective manner.

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managerial cost make defense-in-depth impractical to fully implement (Small 2011), because massive unnecessary efforts might be wasted on irrelevant attack vectors and security activities. With limited resources, system wide defense-in-depth provides only awide but low-level defenseacrossthenetwork, which might be able to stop sophisticated attackers.

~~Defense in depth vs. Critical Component Defense for ...~~
Prescott takes a very interesting and informative view on defense in depth in this book - he describes on how IT secuirty traditionally is inefficient its approach to secuirty fors its critical infrastructure - he put in a great amount of thought into why traditional models of defense in depth fail and then turns around and describes how to appraoch the problem in a more mature manner...

This peer reviewed work addresses how Businesses and Information Technology Security Professionals have spent a tremendous amount of time, money and resources to deploy a Defense in Depth approach to Information Technology Security. Yet successful attacks against RSA, HB Gary, Booz, Allen & Hamilton, the United States Military, and many others are examples of how Defense in Depth, as practiced, is unsustainable and the examples show that the enemy cannot be eliminated permanently. A closer look at how Defense in Depth evolved and how it was made to fit within Information Technology is important to help better understand the trends seen today. Knowing that Defense in Depth, as practiced, actually renders the organization more vulnerable is vital to understanding that there must be a shift in attitudes and thinking to better address the risks faced in a more effective manner. Based on examples in this paper, a change is proposed in the current security and risk management models from the Defense in Depth model to Sustained Cyber-Siege Defense. The implications for this are significant in that there have to be transitions in thinking as well as how People, Process and Technology are implemented to better defend against a never ending siege by a limitless number and variety of attackers that cannot be eliminated. The suggestions proposed are not a drastic change in operations as much as how defenses area aligned, achieve vendor collaboration by applying market pressures and openly sharing information with each other as well as with federal and state agencies. By more accurately describing the problems, corporations and IT Security Professionals will be better equipped to address the challenges faced together.

This book focuses on the ways in which military installations and small cities can implement and integrate triple net planning and energy, water, and waste sustainability strategies into broad installation operational management, arrive at the best decision, create policy and communicate effectively to stakeholders. It explores current and emerging technologies, methods, and frameworks for energy conservation, efficiency, and renewable energy within the context of triple net zero implementation practice. Recognizing that the challenge extends beyond finding technological solutions to achieve triple net zero outcomes, the contributions also address the need for a systemic view in the planning phase, as well as adequate communication and policy measures and incentives.

[Includes 2 tables, 14 charts, 33 maps and 89 illustrations] In the capture of the southern Marianas during the summer of 1944, Army ground and air forces played an important, though subordinate, role to that of the Navy and its Marine Corps. Marine personnel constituted the bulk of the combat troops employed. The objective of this campaign was "to secure control of sea communications through the Central Pacific by isolating and neutralizing the Carolines and by the establishment of sea and air bases for operations against Japanese sea routes and long-range air attacks against the Japanese home land." Its success would provide steppingstones from which the Americans could threaten further attack westward toward the Philippines, Formosa, and Japan itself, and would gain bases from which the Army Air Forces' new very long range bombers, the B-29's, could strike at Japan's heartland. Recognizing and accepting the challenge, the Japanese Navy suffered heavy and irreplaceable losses in the accompanying Battle of the Philippine Sea; and the islands after capture became the base for all the massive air attacks on Japan, beginning in Nov. 1944. In the operations described in the present volume, landings against strong opposition demonstrated the soundness of the amphibious doctrine and techniques evolved out of hard experience in preceding Pacific operations. Bitter inland fighting followed the landings, with Army and Marine Corps divisions engaged side by side. The author's account and corresponding Marine Corps histories of these operations provide ample opportunity to study the differences in the fighting techniques of the two services. Dr. Crowl also deals frankly with one of the best-known controversies of World War II, that of Smith versus Smith, but concludes that it was the exception to generally excellent interservice co-operation.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 35th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, SAFECOMP 2016, held in Trondheim, Norway, in September 2016. The 24 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 71 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on fault injection, safety assurance, formal verification, automotive, anomaly detection and resilience, cyber security, fault trees, and safety analysis.

In Dying to Learn, Michael Hunzeker develops a novel theory to explain how wartime militaries learn. He focuses on the Western Front, which witnessed three great-power armies struggle to cope with deadlock throughout the First World War, as the British, French, and German armies all pursued the same solutions-assault tactics, combined arms, and elastic defense in depth. By the end of the war, only the German army managed to develop and implement a set of revolutionary offensive, defensive, and combined arms doctrines that in hindsight represented the best way to fight. Hunzeker identifies three organizational variables that determine how fighting militaries generate new ideas, distinguish good ones from bad ones, and implement the best of them across the entire organization. These factors are: the degree to which leadership delegates authority on the battlefield; how effectively the organization retains control over soldier and officer training; and whether or not the military possesses an independent doctrinal assessment mechanism. Through careful study of the British, French, and German experiences in the First World War, Dying to Learn provides a model that shows how a resolute focus on analysis, command, and training can help prepare modern militaries for adapting amidst high-intensity warfare in an age of revolutionary technological change.